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Abstract This article examines the association
between creditor protection, as measured by the
nature of legal rules and the quality of law enforce-
ment, and multiple bank relationships using a unique
survey sample of SMEs from 19 European countries.
We find that the likelihood of multiple banking is the
highest for SMEs in French-civil-law countries, next
highest for German-civil-law countries, and the
lowest in Scandinavian-civil-law and English-
common-law countries. We also find that SMEs in
countries with low legal efficiency are more likely to
establish multiple bank relationships. These results
seems to confirm the underlying idea in the law and
finance literature that relevant loan risk for banks also
arises from low quality of laws and institutions and
not just from firm-specific characteristics. Banks in
countries where protection of creditor rights is poor
may resort to multiple banking to share this additional
risk. Policy makers can use our findings to justify the
necessity of improving their institutions by reducing
legal formalisms and thereby, lowering the enforce-
ment costs in the courts. This would lead to better loan
contracting and enhance the flow of debt capital,
which is required for a healthy and dynamic economy.
Keywords Creditor rights  SMEs  Bank
relationships  Legal environment  Financial systems
JEL Classifications G21  G32  L26
1 Introduction
A topic that receives considerable attention in the
financial intermediation literature is the existence of
multiple bank relationships. Financial intermediation
theory suggests that the ability of banks and firms to
benefit from the use of private information deter-
mines whether single or multiple banking prevails.
This is especially true for SMEs, which are, com-
pared to large firms, informationally more opaque
and, therefore, are more prone to the advantages and
disadvantages of proprietary information that flows
into an exclusive bank relationship (Diamond 1984;
Ramakrishnan and Thakor 1984; Boyd and Prescott
1986; Petersen and Rajan 1994).
Many researchers have tried to explain observed
differences in the number of bank relationships at the
firm level, but more recent studies suggest that firms
and banks may also use the number of bank relation-
ships to mitigate a country’s legal and institutional
constraints. The existence of a link between a coun-
try’s financial system and its institutional environment
first appeared in the finance and law literature (La
Porta et al. 1997, 1998; Levine 1998). These studies
indicate that relevant loan risk for banks arises not
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only from the firm’s credit worthiness, but also from
the quality of laws and institutions in the environment
the bank operates in. In a legal system with rules that
strongly protect the rights of creditors and mecha-
nisms that rigorously enforce the law, lenders can
more easily control borrower risk and reduce the
expected loss in the event of default. However, in
countries with weak protection of creditor rights,
lenders have to resort to contracting tools that do not
rely on laws or institutions, such as diffuse ownership
of loans. There are some recent studies attempting to
explain the observed difference in the number of bank
relationships, but a comprehensive analysis specifi-
cally examining the impact of cross-country variation
in the number of bank relationships for European
SMEs is to our knowledge not available yet.1
Our article attempts to fill this void by analyzing a
unique sample of 4,959 SMEs from 19 European
countries. The use of such a broad sample allows us
to examine if country-specific determinants influence
the firm–bank relationship beyond firm-specific fac-
tors. We begin our analysis by testing if cross-country
differences are significant in explaining variation in
multiple banking. Consistent with our conjecture we
find that 12 out of 18 country dummies are significant
at the 1% level. We then examine the effect of the
country’s legal origin on multiple bank relationships
for SMEs. We find that firms in French-civil-law
countries are more likely to maintain several bank
relationships than firms operating under German-
civil-law, while single banking seems to be more
likely for firms in English-common-law and Scandi-
navian-civil-law countries. However, we still find
additional variation in the number of bank relation-
ships that cannot be explained by legal origin alone.
To further analyze this, we next examine several
country-specific determinants of multiple banking,
specifically, those factors that reflect the protection of
creditor rights, proxied by laws and the efficiency of
institutions enforcing these laws. Our results indicate
that SMEs in countries with inefficient loan enforce-
ment mechanisms and strong protection of creditor
rights are more likely to maintain multiple bank
relationships, showing that banks use multiple banking
as a non-price mechanism to control for country-
specific risk. We also show that the association between
multiple banking and bank fragility is non-monotonous.
An increase in bank fragility reduces the likelihood of
multiple bank relationships for firms operating in stable
banking systems. SMEs operating in fragile banking
systems are more likely to maintain multiple bank
relationships as bank fragility increases. Financial
environment also seems to have a significant impact
on whether SMEs maintain one or multiple bank
relationships. The likelihood of multiple bank relation-
ships increases for SMEs operating in countries where
the banking system is more developed and concentrated
and where capital markets are smaller and less active.
The above results show that part of the relationship
between the bank and the firm is also shaped by
country-specific characteristics, mainly by factors
linked to the quality of laws and institutions related to
protecting creditor rights.
The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 dis-
cusses previous research and develops the hypotheses.
Section 3 presents the data and method. Section 4
presents the results, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Theory and hypotheses development
In Europe, we observe large cross-country variation
in the number of bank relationships established by
small firms. Although, some of this variation might
be explained in terms of demand and risk factors
linked to firm-specific characteristics, the law and
finance literature suggests that differences in legal
systems across countries might also influence the
number of bank relationships per firm.2 The under-
lying idea, pioneered by La Porta et al. (1997, 1998)
1 Ongena and Smith (2000) report that differences in the legal
and the financial environment across countries explain some of
the variation in the number of bank relationships for large
firms, while Detragiache et al. (2000) show that the likelihood
of multiple banking for Italian SMEs depends on loan
enforcement mechanisms and fragility of banks.
2 Much of the early financial intermediation theory assumes
that the choice between single and multiple bank relationships
depends to a large extent on the ability of firms and banks to
benefit from the use of private information that flows into an
exclusive bank relationship. The lender has monopoly access to
proprietary information about the borrower (Kane and Malkiel
1965), which reduces the ability of the firm to change banks
(Greenbaum et al. 1989) and enables the lender to extract
monopoly rents (Sharpe 1990). The firm, in turn, may benefit
from enhanced access to debt capital (Petersen and Rajan 1994;
Berger and Udell 1995) and increased flexibility (Boot and
Thakor 1994).
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and Levine (1998), is that loan contracts are more
efficient in countries where the environment is more
tailored to writing and enforcing financial contracts.
This in contrast to environments where banks have to
deal with additional risk, beyond the firm level,
arising from low quality of laws and institutions.
In a legal system with rules that strongly protect
the rights of creditors and mechanisms that rigorously
enforce the law, lenders can more easily control
borrower risk and reduce the expected loss in the
event of default. In such an environment single
banking, which is more cost efficient than multiple
banking (Diamond 1984; Ramakrishnan and Thakor
1984; Boyd and Prescott 1986), should dominate.
However, to reduce borrower risk in countries with
weak protection of creditor rights, lenders resort to
contracting tools that do not rely on laws or
institutions, such as diffuse ownership of loans.3
Multiple banking helps to reduce this risk in two
ways. First, by increasing the degree of diversifica-
tion loan risk is shared by more banks and second, by
increasing the ex post cost of debt restructuring the
incentive for borrowers to default strategically is
reduced (Bolton and Scharfstein 1996).4
La Porta et al. (1998) show that variation in
creditor protection across countries can be explained
in terms of cross-country differences in legal origin.
They find that creditor rights are the least emphasized
in French-civil-law countries and that their legal
systems are the weakest in enforcing contracts. They
also show that common-law countries enhance cred-
itor rights the most, while countries with German and
Scandinavian legal traditions have the most efficient
enforcing mechanisms. We conjecture that the like-
lihood of multiple banking relationships is the highest
for firms in countries with French legal heritage,
where protection of creditor rights is the weakest.
The influence of legal and institutional differences
on non-price terms of loan contracts has received
considerable attention for large firms (Demirgu¨c¸-
Kunt and Maksimovic 1998, 1999; Ongena and Smith
2000; Esty and Megginson 2003; Bancel and Mittoo
2004; Qian and Strahan 2007).5 Regarding determi-
nants of loan contracts for small firms, a number of
contributions suggest, however, that law and institu-
tional factors are even more important for small firms
than for large firms (Holmstrom and Tirole 1997;
Hall et al. 2004; Jo˜eveer 2005). We are only aware of
one paper examining the association between multi-
ple banking and loan enforcement mechanisms for
SMEs. This paper, by Detragiache et al. (2000),
shows that weak loan enforcement mechanisms
increase the likelihood of multiple banking for Italian
SMEs. Our study adds to the literature of bank
relationships by analyzing the effect of a country0s
legal system on multiple banking for a sample of
4,959 SMEs from 19 European countries. In the next
section, we present our data and method.
3 Data and method
3.1 Data
To create our initial sample we utilize several data
sources. First, country-level information is obtained
from the Conference on Bank Concentration and
Competition, La Porta et al. (1998), Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt
and Levine (1999), and Ongena and Smith (2000).
3 Diamond (2004) shows that shorter-term loans with more
diffuse ownership make it easier for lenders to enforce
contracts, especially in countries with inefficient enforcement
mechanisms and poor protection of creditor rights.
4 Multiple banking may also serve banks to increase their
bargaining power. According to Ergungor (2004), firms cannot
commit themselves to not exploit the lender and banks cannot
trust courts for a fair solution of the conflict when creditor
rights are poor. To enforce contracts without court intervention
banks can credibly threaten the borrower with withholding
valuables services such as loans and credits. In doing so a bank
prefers the involvement of other lenders in the firm thereby
reducing the soft budget constraint and making the threat of
withholding the funds more credible.
5 Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998, 1999) report that
short-term financing is more frequently used by publicly traded
firms in countries where the legal system is inefficient or costly
to use, while Ongena and Smith (2000) show that differences in
the legal environment across countries explain some of the
variation observed in the number of bank relationships. Esty
and Megginson (2003) find that lenders in countries with weak
protection of rights and unreliable legal enforcement mecha-
nisms create larger and more diffuse syndicates to deter
strategic default. Bancel and Mittoo (2004) report that factors
related to debt are influenced more by the country’s institu-
tional structure than those related to equity. Results provided
by Qian and Strahan (2007) show that under weak creditor
protection, banks loans are associated with more diffused
ownership and shorter maturities.
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Second, firm-specific variables are obtained from
the 2002 ENSR survey on small and medium-sized
enterprises, Observatory of European SMEs, pro-
vided by the EIM Business and Policy Research in
The Netherlands.6 From the 7,669 checked and
approved interviews that are available in the ENSR
Survey 2002, we selected the 4,959 observations that
contain information about the number of banking
relationships of the individual firms. In Table 1 we
provide the distribution of the sample by country and
sector. The number of firms per country ranges from
88 in Liechtenstein to 583 in Italy. As for the nine
activity sectors considered in the survey, the lowest
representation corresponds to the Repair and Hotels/
Catering industries with 114 and 236 observations,
respectively, whereas 891 and 753 firms belong to the
Manufacturing and Construction industries,
respectively.
3.2 Method
In this section, we present the variables and the model
we use to analyze the effect of country-specific
characteristics on the one versus multiple banking
decision.
3.2.1 The dependent variable
To create the dependent variable we utilize the
ENSR Survey in which managers are asked the
number of banks they have credit lines with. The
answers are categorized as follows: (a) only one
bank, (b) two or three banks, and (c) four banks or
more. Using these answers we build a dummy
variable, multiple, which is given a value of one
when the number of bank relationships is higher
than one and zero otherwise.
Table 2 gives an overview of the number of bank
relationships by country and firm size ranked in
ascending order. Panel A of Table 2 shows that firms
in North European countries, such as Denmark, Great
Britain, and The Netherlands, among others, have, on
average, fewer bank relationships than firms in
countries such as Spain, Portugal, and Italy. For
example, 79% of the firms in the UK maintain only
one bank relationship, while 21% uses two or three
banks, and only 0.5% deals with four or more banks.
This in contrast to Spain where only 22% has one
bank relationship compared to 40% with two or three
bank relationships, and 37% with four or more. Panel
B shows the number of bank relationships by firm
size. Less than 6% of micro and small firms are
involved with more than three banks, while for
medium size firms this is more than 19%. Overall, the
cross country patterns observed in our SME sample
seem to be rather consistent with the patterns
observed by Ongena and Smith (2000) in a sample
of large firms.
3.2.2 The independent variables
In this section, we describe the explanatory variables
utilized in our posterior analysis of multiple banking.
We do so by classifying the variables into country-
and firm-specific characteristics. Table 3 provides
detailed definitions of all the variables.
Country-specific characteristics. The variables in
this section represent the country-specific character-
istics that influence the supply and terms of credit that
lenders are willing to provide to borrowers. We
consider two sets of country-specific variables. The
first set includes the variables creditor rights, rule of
law and legal efficiency, which account for differ-
ences across countries in legal protection of creditor
rights and quality of enforcement mechanisms.
Though we consider these variables the most impor-
tant determining factors of multiple banking, we also
include a second set of country-specific variables,
such as commercial banking concentration, private
credit, trade and capitalization, to control for unmea-
sured variation in credit supply.
The variable creditor rights tabulate scores using
two default strategies, being liquidation and
6 The 2002 ENSR Survey on SMEs uses a computer-assisted
telephone interviewing (CATI) system to collect data from
entrepreneurs and managers within SMEs, all being indepen-
dent private enterprises with less than 250 employees in all
sectors of industry in Europe. The survey was conducted from
April–August 2001. To arrive at sufficiently reliable conclu-
sions at the level of size classes within individual countries
more than 100 interviews for each size class-country combi-
nation were carried out, finally resulting in 7,699 completed
interviews. The overall design and implementation of the
stratification, the questionnaire, and the fieldwork were done in
close collaboration between staff from EIM Business and
Policy Research in the Netherlands, partners in the ENSR
network and Intromart. See http://europa.eu.int/comm/
enterprise/enterprise_policy/analysis/observatory_en.htm for
further information.
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reorganization. The index ranges from 0 to 4, with
higher values indicating the existence of more
creditor rights.7 The variable rule of law is an
assessment of the law and order tradition in the
country provided by the International Country Risk
(ICR) Agency. This index ranges from 0 to 10, where
low levels of the score denote less reliance on the
legal system to mediate disputes. In the same spirit of
Ongena and Smith (2000) we create an interaction
variable creditor rights * rule of law to take into
account that real creditor protection not only depends
on laws, but also on their enforcement as well. High
quality of legal system enforcement could substitute
for weak rules, because active and well-functioning
courts can step in and rescue investors abused by firm
management. Legal efficiency is an index produced
by the country risk rating agency Business Interna-
tional Corporation. This is an assessment of the
efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it
affects business and ranges from zero to 10, with
lower scores indicating lower efficiency levels. We
expect the sign for the variables creditor rights * rule
of law and legal efficiency to be negative, because for
banks the benefits of multiple bank relationships
Table 2 Overview of number of bank relationships by country and firm size ranked in ascending order
Country N Average One bank
relationship
Two or three
bank relationships
Four or more bank
relationships
Panel A. Number of bank relationships by country ranked in ascending order
Denmark 248 1.2056 198 49 1
UK 378 1.2169 298 78 2
The Netherlands 219 1.2511 166 51 2
Norway 204 1.2696 154 45 5
Sweden 214 1.3271 149 60 5
Finland 182 1.3846 116 62 4
Iceland 196 1.449 114 76 6
Ireland 219 1.4977 125 79 15
France 450 1.5578 223 203 24
Lichtenstein 88 1.5909 43 38 7
Germany 264 1.6439 111 136 17
Switzerland 213 1.6526 90 107 16
Austria 270 1.7296 94 155 21
Luxemburg 160 1.7375 65 72 23
Belgium 274 1.7445 98 148 28
Greece 249 1.8514 75 136 38
Italy 583 1.8954 164 316 103
Portugal 214 1.9766 54 111 49
Spain 334 2.1527 74 135 125
Total 4,959 2,411 2,057 491
Panel B. Number of bank relationships by firm size ranked in ascending order
Number of employees
0–9 2,454 1.5122 1,340 971 143
10–49 1,392 1.6128 671 589 132
50–249 1,113 1.8347 400 497 216
Total 4,959 2,411 2,057 491
Table 2 gives an overview of the number of firm–bank relationships by country and firm size ranked in ascending order. Data are
obtained from the 2002 ENSR survey on small and medium-sized enterprises, observatory of European SMEs, provided by the EIM
Business and Policy Research in The Netherlands
7 See La Porta et al. (1998).
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Table 3 Description of variables and data sources
Variable name Description and source
Dependent variable
Exclusivitya Dummy variable that takes on the value one when the firm has credit lines with more than
one bank and zero otherwise
Country and industry dummies
Industry dummiesa Nine industry dummies indicating the firm main activity. Each variable takes on the value
one if the firm belongs to one of the following sectors: Manufacturing, Construction,
Wholesale Trade, Retail Trade, Hotels and Catering, Repair, Transport and
Communications, Business Services, and Other Service Industries; and zero otherwise
Country dummies Nineteen country dummies
Firm-specific characteristics
Sizea An indicator of the firm size, which takes on the values: 1 when the firm has less than 9
employees, 2 when the number of employees is between 10 and 49, and 3 when the
number of employees is between 50 and 250
Agea A measure of the number of years that the firm has been in operation, which takes on the
values: 1 when it has been less than 2 years, 2 when it has been between 2 and 5 years, 3
when it has been between 5 and 10 years, and 4 when it has been more than 10 years
Soft informationa Dummy variable that takes on the value one when the bank obtains only qualitative (soft)
information from the firm and zero when it gets hard information: (1) Balance Sheet and
Profit and Loss statement, (2) budget for next year(s), (3) financial plan and cash flow
forecast, and (4) information on unpaid invoices; or both kinds of information.
Hard informationa Dummy variable that takes on the value one when the bank only obtains hard information
from the firm: (1) Balance Sheet and Profit and Loss statement, (2) budget for next
year(s), (3) financial plan and cash flow forecast, and (4) information on unpaid invoices;
and zero when it gets soft information or both types of information
Country-specific characteristics
Bank fragilityb A measure of the fragility of a country’s banking system, measured as the average credit
rating of tracked banks within a country. It ranges from 0 to 10, with lower scores
implying less bank default risk
Commercial banking concentrationc A measure of the degree of concentration of the banking sector, calculated as the fraction of
assets held by the three largest commercial banks in the country, averaged over the
period 1995–1999
Private creditd A measure of the financial intermediary development, calculated as claims on the private
sector by the deposit money banks to GDP average over the period 1990–1997
Traded A measure of capital markets activity, calculated as the value of the trades of domestic
equities on domestic exchanges divided by GDP average over the period 1990–1997
Capitalizationd A measure of capital markets size, calculated as the ratio of the value of domestic equities
traded on domestic exchanges to GDP average over the period 1990–1997
Legal efficiencye An assessment of the efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it affects business,
particularly foreign firms, averaged over the period 1980–1983. It is produced by the
country risk rating agency Business International Corporation and it may be taken to
represent investors’ assessments of conditions in the country in question. The index
ranges from zero to 10, with higher values indicating higher efficiency levels
Creditor rightse An indicator of the protection of creditor rights, calculated by adding one for each of the
following conditions that the country’s bankruptcy law satisfies: (i) the country imposes
restrictions, such as creditors’ consent or minimum dividends to file for reorganization;
(ii) secured creditors are able to gain possession of their security once the reorganization
petition has been approved (no automatic stay); (iii) secured creditors are ranked first in
the distribution of the proceeds that result from the disposition of the assets of a bankrupt
firm; and (iv) the debtor does not retain the administration of its property pending the
resolution of the reorganization. The index ranges from zero to four, with higher values
indicating the existence of more creditor rights
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decrease when the efficiency of the legal system and
the protection of creditor rights increase.
To ensure that the above institutional variables
really reflect differences in credit supply across
countries due only to variations in legal systems,
we control for unmeasured variation in credit supply
using several factors related with a country0s financial
system. The variable bank fragility is the average
credit rating across banks rated within a country and
defined as a range between 0 and 10, with lower
values corresponding to less default risk. In stable
banking systems banks are more likely to withhold a
loan due to low quality of the borrower than because
of liquidity restrictions from the side of the bank,
increasing the proportion of low quality firms looking
to refinance their projects. Then, as the banking
system becomes more stable we expect that firms will
have better access to additional funding from rela-
tionship banks than to new loans from other lenders,
thereby increasing the likelihood of multiple banking.
Commercial banking concentration is proxied by the
fraction of bank assets held by the three largest
commercial banks in each country. In concentrated
banking systems, reduced inter-bank competition
decreases the ability of firms to raise debt capital
from non-relationship banks, increasing the likeli-
hood of multiple banking. The degree of development
of the banking system in a country is measured with
the variable private credit, which is defined as claims
on the private sector by deposit money banks to GDP.
We measure market activity with the variable trade,
which is the value of the trades of domestic equities
on domestic exchanges divided by GDP, whereas the
variable capitalization, which equals the ratio of the
value of domestic equities traded on domestic
exchanges to GDP, proxies for market size. If
securities market and bank loan financing are alter-
native sources of funding, one would expect that
firms in countries with better developed capital
markets (banking systems) are less (more) likely to
establish multiple bank relationships. Table 4 gives
an overview of the variables by country.
Firm-specific characteristics. We account for the
heterogeneity across firms including several firm-
specific control variables in our model.8 Empirical
evidence shows that firm size, age, and activity sector
are important determinants of the number of bank
relationships.9 To proxy for firm size we use the
number of employees working in the firm. This
variable is coded from 1 to 3, where 1 represents
firms with 0–9 employees, 2 are firms with 10–49
employees, and 3 are firms with 50–249 employees,
or what we respectively call micro, small, and
medium firms. The variable age reflects the number
of years that the firm has been in operation. It ranges
from 1 to 4, with 1 being less than 2 years in
operation, 2 representing 2–5 years, 3 being 5–
10 years, and 4 more than 10 years in operation.
Finally, we include nine sector dummies to control
for differences across industries.
Table 3 continued
Variable name Description and source
Law and ordere An assessment of the law and order tradition in the country, produced by the country risk
rating agency international country risk (ICR). Average of the months of April and
October of the monthly index over the period 1982–1995. The index ranges from zero to
10, with higher scores denoting more tradition for law and order
Data sources:
a 2002 ENSR survey on SMEs
b Ongena and Smith (2000)
c Conference on Bank Concentration and Competition. Data available at: http://www.worldbank.org/research/interest/confs/
042003/data.htm
d Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Levine (1999)
e La Porta et al. (1998)
8 In the construction of our firm-specific dummy variables we
are limited by the answer categories as used in the ENSR
survey.
9 See Detragiache et al. (2000), Degryse and Ongena (2001)
and Herna´ndez-Ca´novas and Martı´nez-Solano (2005) among
others.
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We also include a dummy variable to proxy for the
flow of information inside the firm–bank relationship.
Berger et al. (2001) distinguish two kinds of informa-
tion flows. On the one hand, firms can give hard
information, which is easily observable, verifiable, and
transmittable data. On the other hand, banks can also
obtain soft information, which is gathered by interac-
tion between the loan officer and the firm’s manager
and refers to the manager’s capabilities, integrity, and
the quality of firm projects. This kind of information
appears to be very important in relationship lending,
since small businesses usually are lacking reliable hard
information. From the ENSR survey we obtain what
type of information the firms regularly present to their
bank(s). We create three dummy variables, one if the
firm only presents soft information, one if the firm only
presents hard information and one when the firm
provides both soft and hard information. We use the
variable ‘both’ as our base category in the analysis. As
shown by Von Rheinbaben and Ruckes (2004), firms
shape their relationship with banks using two dimen-
sions: the number of creditors and the amount of
confidential information given to the creditors. Firms
that disclose a substantial amount of private informa-
tion are more likely to work with a small number of
creditors in order to restrict the dissemination of
confidential information, whereas firms disclosing
little private information are less worried to deal with
many lenders. We therefore expect a negative associ-
ation between the flow of soft information and the
likelihood of having multiple bank relationships and a
positive association for firms that only provide hard
information.
Table 5 describes the information in possession of
banks by country and size. The majority of firms
(85%) provide their bank(s) with some form of
balance sheet and/or income statement. Other forms
of information disclosure are less common for SMEs.
Surprisingly, 306 out of 4,959 firms (6%) do not
provide information at all to their bank(s). The
release of soft information ranges from 68% in
Norway to 2% and 6% in France and Italy, respec-
tively, which seems consistent with the argument of
Von Rheinbaben and Ruckes (2004).
Table 4 Country-specific characteristics
Creditor
rights
Law and
order
Legal
efficiency
Private
credit
Commercial banking
concentration
Bank
fragility
Capitalization Trade
Austria 3 10 9.5 0.93 0.44 3.90 0.12 0.08
Belgium 2 10 9.5 0.56 0.75 4.50 0.36 0.05
Denmark 3 10 10 0.38 0.71 5.25 0.34 0.16
Finland 1 10 10 0.77 0.75 6.21 0.29 0.12
France 0 8.98 8 0.89 0.33 4.63 0.33 0.17
Germany 3 9.23 9 0.94 0.32 2.23 0.24 0.28
Greece 1 6.18 7 0.18 0.71 9.00 0.15 0.06
Iceland – – – – 0.87 – – –
Ireland 1 7.8 8.75 0.29 0.68 4.43 0.26 0.14
Italy 2 8.33 6.75 0.52 0.30 5.77 0.17 0.08
Liechtenstein – – – – – – – –
Luxembourg – – – – 0.21 3.17 0.69 0.43
The Netherlands 2 10 10 0.90 0.81 5.89 0.26 0.14
Norway 2 10 10 0.57 0.61 5.47 0.13 0.05
Portugal 1 8.68 5.5 0.54 0.46 4.75 0.30 0.23
Spain 2 7.8 6.25 0.69 0.54 5.70 0.62 0.33
Sweden 2 10 10 0.46 0.78 4.27 0.98 0.76
Switzerland 1 10 10 1.65 0.77 2.63 1.13 0.55
UK 4 8.57 10 1.14 0.47 3.17 0.69 0.43
Table 4 gives an overview of country-specific characteristics. See Table 3 for an exact variable description
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3.2.3 The model
To examine the impact of country-specific charac-
teristics on the likelihood of multiple banking
we estimate logistic regressions in the following
form:
Multiplei ¼ Uða þ b1CSVi þ b2FSCi þ eiÞ ð1Þ
where Multiplei is the dummy variable indicating
whether the ith firm maintains one or multiple bank
relationships; CSVi is a vector of country-specific
variables; FSCi represents the set of firm-specific
control characteristics; and ei is the residual.
4 Results
4.1 Firm-level regressions
In model 1, Table 6, we first analyze the existence of
differences across firms in the number of bank
relationships by regressing the variable multiple on
firm size and age, and the flow of information.
Consistent with our expectations and most of the
empirical evidence for SMEs, we find that larger and
older firms are more likely to maintain multiple bank
relationships. Large firms are more complex, have
higher financing needs. and require more variety of
Table 5 Overview of information provided by SMEs to banks by country and size
Country N Balance/income Budget Pro-forma Inventory Unpaid invoices Qualitative
(soft info)
Panel A. Information in possession of banks by country
Austria 270 261 75 86 49 106 69
Belgium 274 256 69 75 55 63 43
Denmark 248 224 95 48 24 21 23
Finland 182 165 20 20 13 6 34
France 450 415 41 28 8 7 7
Germany 264 248 22 25 14 23 26
Greece 249 242 62 57 56 20 50
Iceland 196 178 65 31 49 44 17
Ireland 219 182 65 81 29 35 26
Italy 583 508 91 44 21 57 33
Liechtenstein 88 77 21 14 10 17 13
Luxembourg 160 134 21 16 4 11 16
The Netherlands 219 196 59 56 42 84 24
Norway 204 91 51 40 43 25 130
Portugal 214 201 20 21 14 24 16
Spain 334 240 36 29 14 14 39
Sweden 214 180 93 75 52 32 50
Switzerland 213 198 59 43 26 29 21
UK 378 311 98 104 58 59 57
Total 4,959 4,307 1,063 893 581 677 694
Panel B. Information in possession of banks by firm size
Number of employees
0–9 2,454 2,126 365 283 210 263 260
10–49 1,392 1,233 335 293 192 220 208
50–249 1,113 948 363 317 179 194 226
Total 4,959 4,307 1,063 893 581 677 694
Table 5 gives an overview of the information SMEs provide to their banks by country and firm size ranked in ascending order. Data
are obtained from the 2002 ENSR survey on small and medium-sized enterprises, observatory of European SMEs, provided by the
EIM Business and Policy Research in The Netherlands
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financial services, explaining why they allocate their
banking business across multiple financial interme-
diaries. In addition, establishing bank relationships
takes time, which explains the positive association
between age and multiple banking. As predicted by
Von Rheinbaben and Ruckes (2004), we find that
SMEs that provide only hard information are more
likely to have more banking relationships than firms
who provide both, soft and hard information, while
firms only providing soft information are more likely
to maintain a single bank relationship to restrict the
disclosure of confidential information.
In model 2 we include the eight industry dummies,
leaving out other services industries, which we use as
Table 6 Logistic regressions of single versus multiple bank relationships on firm level variables and country dummies
(1) (2) (3)
Constant -1.0642*** (0.1759) -1.0966*** (0.1960) -3.2863*** (0.2905)
Firm-specific characteristics
Size 0.3562*** (0.0373) 0.3399*** (0.0381) 0.5591*** (0.0451)
Age 0.1051*** (0.0411) 0.1086*** (0.0415) 0.2030*** (0.0477)
Hard information 0.1733* 0.1009 0.1627 (0.1018) 0.0953 (0.1191)
Soft information -0.2112** (0.0851) -0.2043** (0.0858) 0.0448 (0.0996)
Industry dummies
Manufacturing industry 0.2210* (0.1137) 0.1961 (0.1293)
Construction -0.3149*** (0.1176) -0.0992 (0.1334)
Wholesale trade 0.3482*** (0.1232) 0.3720*** (0.1390)
Retail trade 0.0378 (0.1198) -0.0791 (0.1351)
Hotels/catering -0.0834 (0.1602) -0.3689** (0.1748)
Repair -0.1360 (0.2112) 0.1292 (0.2361)
Transport/communications 0.1312 (0.1247) 0.3811*** (0.1414)
Business services 0.0717 (0.1223) 0.0503 (0.1373)
Country dummies
Austria 1.9431*** (0.2123)
Belgium 1.8182*** (0.2116)
Denmark -0.1691 (0.2317)
Finland 0.4976** (0.2295)
France 1.5906*** (0.1946)
Germany 1.9564*** (0.2118)
Greece 2.3395*** (0.2199)
Iceland 1.1201*** (0.2236)
Ireland 0.9559 (0.2156)
Italy 2.6700*** (0.1944)
Lichtenstein 1.6118*** (0.2767)
Luxembourg 1.8212*** (0.2344)
Norway 0.0493 (0.2440)
Portugal 2.4441*** (0.2315)
Spain 2.8429*** (0.2179)
Sweden 0.2539 (0.2252)
Switzerland 1.4900*** (0.2188)
UK 0.1676 (0.2112)
Observations 4,959 4,959 4,959
Adjusted-R2 0.033 0.045 0.257
*, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level
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our base category. Manufacturing and Wholesale
Trade (Construction) have positive (negative) and
statistically significant coefficients, indicating that
firms in those sector of activity are more (less) likely
to maintain multiple bank relationships than busi-
nesses belonging to the sector of other service
industries. The results for the firm-specific variables
remain qualitatively the same.
In model 3, we add the 18 country dummies to the
firm-level characteristics. We don’t include a dummy
for The Netherlands, which we use as our base
category. After including the country dummies the
variable soft information becomes statistically insig-
nificant. This suggests that the negative association
between the flow of private information and the
number of banks predicted by Von Rheinbaben and
Ruckes (2004) is not orthogonal to cross-country
heterogeneity. It might be that fear of information
disclosure, which makes firms work with fewer
banks, depends on the institutional environment of
the country. It also should be notice that after
including the country dummies, the coefficients of
the industry dummies Manufacturing and Construc-
tion become insignificant, whereas those of Hotel/
Catering and Transport/Communications become
significant with a negative and a positive sign
respectively. This suggests that some cross country
differences in multiple banking could be explained by
industry specialization. In unreported descriptive
statistics we find that firms operating in the construc-
tion sector have on average few bank relationships
(57% has one bank relationship compared to only 7%
that have 4 or more). Table 1 reveals that construc-
tion is the dominant sector in Denmark and Norway
which indeed belong to the countries that on average
have the fewest bank relationships. In addition, the
manufacturing sector has on average many bank
relationships and is highly concentrated in Spain, the
country with the most bank relationships as is shown
in Table 2.10
Inspection of model 3 also reveals that 12 out of 18
country dummies are statistically significant at the
1% level. To confirm the existence of significant
cross-country differences in multiple banking for
SMEs, we test the hypothesis that all the country
estimates are equal. The equality is rejected at the 1%
level, which is consistent with the findings for large
companies as reported by Ongena and Smith (2000),
and with the expectations of Detragiache et al. (2000)
for SMEs.
4.2 Explaining cross-country variation
The country dummy estimates in model 3 suggest
that cross-country differences in the likelihood of
multiple banking might be influenced by legal
origin.11 Those countries with higher likelihood of
multiple banking such as Austria, Belgium, France,
Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Swit-
zerland are classified as French or German-civil-law
countries, whereas most of the country estimates that
are not significantly different from our base category
are either English-common-law or Scandinavian-
civil-law countries.
To test whether cross-country variation in multiple
banking might be explained only in terms of legal
origin we next test the equality of the country dummy
estimates within legal origin groupings. We reject the
equality at the 1% level for country dummy estimates
inside the English-common-law and French-civil-law
countries and at the 5% level inside the German- and
Scandinavian-civil-law countries, which suggest that
there is additional variation in the number of bank
relationships that cannot be explained by legal origin
alone.
In model 1 of Table 7, we group the countries
according to their legal origin and regress multiple on
these four groups. We use German-civil-law as our
reference group.12 Estimates of the firm-level
10 We also have run our models by industry, because certain
countries might have a comparative advantage in a certain
sector and therefore different capital requirements. This might
influence the relationship with the lender(s). Although, there is
some variation between industries our ultimate results remain
the same. Results are available upon request.
11 According to La Porta et al. (1998), a country’s legal origin
determines its commercial laws. Commercial laws basically
come from two broad traditions: common law, which is
English in origin, and civil law, which derives from Roman
law. Within the civil tradition, commercial laws originate from
three major families: French, German, and Scandinavian. In
our sample, Ireland and United Kingdom are common-law
countries; Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
Portugal, and Spain are French-origin; Austria, Germany, and
Switzerland are German-origin; Denmark, Finland, Norway,
and Sweden are Scandinavian-origin.
12 Since Iceland, Lichtenstein, and Luxemburg are not clas-
sified, we leave these countries out of the analysis.
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variables remain unchanged, and the three legal
origin dummies are statistically significant at the 1%
level. Our evidence shows that the likelihood of
multiple bank relationships is the highest for SMEs in
French-civil-law countries, next highest in German-
civil-law countries, and the lowest in English-com-
mon-law and Scandinavian-civil-law countries. All
pair-wise comparisons across legal origin groups are
rejected at the 1% level, except for the equality
between English common law and Scandinavian civil
law, which is rejected at the 5% level.
The above evidence suggests that legal origin is a
determining factor of multiple banking for SMEs, but
it might not be the only one. To examine which
country-specific characteristics may explain the multi-
ple versus single banking decision, we replace the
legal origin dummies by our country-level variables.
The results are reported in Table 7, model 2.
Consistent with our expectations we find that the
coefficient of the variable judicial efficiency is
negative and statistically significant at the 1% level.
This corroborates that banks use multiple banking as a
non-price mechanism to control for additional risk in a
country with low quality of enforcement mechanism.
However, contrary to our expectations, the estimate
on the variable creditor rights * rule of law is positive
Table 7 Logistic regressions of single versus multiple bank relationships on legal origin dummies and country-level variables
(1) (2) (3)
Constant -1.4845*** (0.2401) 1.8365*** (0.4173) 2.5589*** (0.5050)
Firm-specific characteristics
Size 0.4988*** (0.0439) 0.4912*** (0.0450) 0.4979*** (0.0452)
Age 0.1258*** (0.0470) 0.2107*** (0.0497) 0.2076***
Hard information 0.0994 (0.1172) 0.3184*** (0.1190) (0.0497) 0.2842**
Soft information 0.0816 (0.0978) -0.0020 (0.0989) -0.010 (0.0993)
Industry dummies
Manufacturing industry 0.3021** (0.1309) 0.2374* (0.1339) 0.2441* (0.1338)
Construction -0.0512 (0.1345) -0.1379 (0.1360) -0.1219 (0.1362)
Wholesale trade 0.3584** (0.1404) 0.5263*** (0.1436) 0.5349*** (0.1437)
Retail trade -0.1841 (0.1358) -0.0900 (0.1384) -0.1236 (0.1390)
Hotels/catering -0.3311* (0.1793) -0.2740 (0.1814) -0.2909 (0.1818)
Repair -0.0057 (0.2442) 0.0422 (0.2454) 0.0559 (0.2459)
Transport/communications 0.4163*** (0.1435) 0.3674*** (0.1448) 0.3789*** (0.1450)
Business services 0.0657 (0.1380) 0.0428 (0.1418) 0.0444 (0.1415)
Legal origin dummies
English-common law -0.9518*** (0.1153)
French-civil law 0.8152*** (0.0843)
Scandinavian-civil law -1.2636*** (0.1070)
Country-specific characteristics
Bank fragility -0.0360 (0.0358) -0.2337** (0.1123)
Bank fragility2 0.0240*** (0.0094)
Legal efficiency -0.6421*** (0.0434) -0.6440*** (0.0433)
Creditor rights * rule of law 0.0207*** (0.0041) 0.0180*** (0.0045)
Private credit 1.8875*** (0.2116) 1.9492*** (0.2158)
Commercial banking concentration 1.8618*** (0.2119) 1.1210*** (0.3059)
Trade -0.8725 (0.5507) -1.2693*** (0.5736)
Capitalization -1.3142*** (0.2955) -1.2152*** (0.2967)
Observations 4,515 4,515 4,515
Adjusted-R2 0.214 0.238 0.239
*, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level
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and significant at the 1% level. We would expect that
multiple banking is more likely for firms in countries
with low protection of creditor rights. Interestingly,
Levine et al. (2000) reports a positive association
between financial intermediary development and the
protection and enforcement of creditor rights within a
country, while our evidence indicates a positive
association between multiple banking and the protec-
tion and enforcement of creditor rights. Given the
result reported by Levine et al. (2000) and the
evidence from our study, this might suggest that firms
are more likely to engage in multiple bank relation-
ships when the banking system is more developed.
The above explanation is also consistent with our
finding of a positive association between multiple
banking and the size of the banking sector. The
coefficient of the variable private credit is positive
and statistically significant at the 1% level. Addi-
tionally, we find a significant negative estimate on the
variables trade and capitalization, which confirms the
predicted substitution effect between securities mar-
ket- and bank-financing. The likelihood of multiple
banking increases with the size of the banking system
and reduces with the size and activity of capital
markets. Finally, the estimate on the variable com-
mercial banking concentration is positive and
significant (a = 0.01). Reduced competition in a
concentrated banking system decreases the ability of
firms to raise debt capital from non-relationship
banks, leading them to establish multiple bank
relationships.13
In model 3, we include the squared value of the
variable bank fragility to take into account potential
non-monotonicities in the multiple banking decision.
Detragiache et al. (2000) predict that the association
between multiple banking and the fragility of the
banking system has an inverse U-shape (increasing
for low values of bank fragility and decreasing for
relatively high values). However, we find that the
coefficients of bank fragility and squared bank
fragility are negative and positive, respectively,
indicating the opposite association to the one reported
by Detragiache et al. (2000). For firms in countries
with stable banking systems, an increase in bank
fragility reduces the likelihood of multiple banking,
whereas those operating in fragile banking systems
are more likely to maintain multiple bank relation-
ships as bank fragility increases. Ongena and Smith
(2000) observe a pattern similar to ours and justify
the result by a desire of firms to diversify in highly
fragile banking systems, while firms in stable banking
systems consolidate services across banks as the
system becomes more fragile. The coefficients of the
other variables in the model remain qualitatively
unchanged after the inclusion of bank fragility
squared.14
5 Conclusion
This article examines the association between pro-
tection of creditors, as measured by the nature of
legal rules and the quality of law enforcement, and
the existence of multiple bank relationships in
European small firms. Based on the law and finance
literature we conjecture that banks use multiple
banking as a non-price mechanism to reduce the
loan risk arising from low quality of laws and
institutions in the environment they operate in. This
would explain the observed variation in the number
of bank relationships per firm across European
countries, in spite of the fact that the financial
intermediation literature suggests that single banking
is more cost efficient than multiple banking. More
specifically, we examine the association between
multiple banking and country-specific characteristics
by analyzing those factors that reflect the protection
of creditor rights, given by the laws and the efficiency
of institutions enforcing these laws.
We perform our analyses using a unique survey
sample of 4,959 SMEs from 19 European countries.
13 Baas and Schrooten (2006) suggest an alternative justifica-
tion for this result. They state that the lack of verifiable
information for SMEs can be compensated through relation-
ship-based lending, which enables lenders to gathered
information about the firm over time. However, relationship-
based lending may lead to relatively high interest rates,
because the information collected by the bank is private. This
effect is exponentially multiplied for firms borrowing from one
bank because the information becomes exclusive, and for firms
operating in a concentrated banking system due to reduced
competition. Therefore, firms operating in a more concentrated
banking system may use multiple banking as a diversification
mechanism to reduce the ability of banks to take advantage of
proprietary information.
14 Also note that the firm level control variables remain the
same across all three models.
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Once we control for demand and risk factors linked to
firm-specific characteristics, our results show that
differences in enforcement costs and legal protection
of creditors account for some variation in multiple
banking across European countries. We find that
multiple banking is more likely in countries with
French civil-law tradition than in legal systems under
German civil law. Single banking seems to be more
likely for firms in countries with English common law
and Scandinavian civil law heritage. This evidence
indicates that legal systems with rules that rigorously
protect creditor rights and efficient law enforcement
mechanisms lead to single banking, hence, to better
loan contracting and financial outcomes.
Next, we analyze which country-specific legal
factors originate cross-country differences in multiple
banking between and within legal origins. Our results
show that SMEs in countries with low legal efficiency
and strong protection of creditor rights are more
likely to establish multiple bank relationships. This
confirms that banks use diffuse ownership of loans as
a non-price mechanism to control country risk
induced by low quality of law enforcement mecha-
nisms. The positive association between multiple
banking and creditor rights seems to be the result of
the financial system’s structure. Countries with
stronger protection of creditor rights have better
developed banking systems which channel most of
the financial resources to investment opportunities.
This leads firms to establish more bank relationships.
However, multiple banking might be less common in
countries where securities market financing can be
used as alternative funding, when bank loans are not
available. Supporting this argument we find that
multiple banking is more likely for firms operating in
countries with larger banking systems, whereas single
banking is more likely in countries where securities
markets are larger and more active.
Our results also show that the association between
multiple banking and the fragility of the banking
system has a U-shape (decreasing for low values of
bank fragility and increasing for relatively high
values). This indicates that firms in stable banking
systems consolidate services across banks as the
system becomes more fragile, while they use multiple
banking as a diversification mechanism in highly
fragile banking systems. The same diversification
argument may explain the positive association that
we find between a country’s concentration of the
banking system and the likelihood of multiple
banking. In fragile and concentrated banking systems,
where refinancing from non-relationship banks might
be difficult if the lender does not roll over the loan, a
firm is more likely to establish multiple bank
relationships to increase the probability that at least
one relationship bank will refinance the project. The
underlying logic in the diversification argument, as
put forth by Detragiache et al. (2000), is that
relationship banks are, compared to non-relationship
banks, more predisposed to refinance the firm
because they have a competitive advantage obtained
from the proprietary information gathered during the
relationship. However, Basel II requires banks to use
standardized credit scoring models, which raises the
question if the use of private information is still
crucial for banks, and if multiple bank relationships
as a diversification mechanism will remain important
to firms. This opens an interesting area for future
research.
The evidence presented in this article has clear
implications for firms, banks, and policy makers.
Firm owners seeking loans can use the results of this
study to better understand the country-specific factors
affecting the supply of credit that lenders are willing
to provide and the conditions under which it is
offered. They can also better manage the number of
banks to be involved with. Banks have a responsi-
bility and financial interest in facilitating the flow of
capital to borrowers of small size. Banks can use our
findings to help borrowers understand which factors
(mainly quality of law and institutions) drive their
decision when reducing the supply of credit. This
might motivate firms to approach multiple bank
lenders to fund their projects. Optimal loan contract-
ing, which allows for an efficient flow of capital from
providers to users of capital, is required for a healthy
and dynamic economy. Policymakers can use these
findings to justify the necessity of improving the
institutions by reducing legal formalisms and thereby,
lowering the enforcement costs in the courts.
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